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This paper studies the impact of external indebtedness on Nigeria’s economic performance. We find
supportive evidence for the crowding out and debt overhang hypotheses in Nigeria. Based on these results,
the paper concludes that the prospects of resolving the debt crisis in Nigeria will depend on deeper debt
relief, diversification of export base and substantial direct foreign investment. Debt relief will enable the
country to use the lean foreign exchange earnings to procure the badly needed inputs for the industrial
sector and upgrading of infrastructures.

However, without a stable political and macroeconomic

environment, efforts at reducing the external debt burden may not be very successful.
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I.

Introduction

T

here is a widespread recognition in the international community that excessive
foreign indebtedness of many developing countries remains a major
impediment to their stability and growth. Developing countries have contracted
large amount of debts, often at highly concessional interest rates particularly in

the 1970s. The hope was that these loans would put them on faster development path
through higher investment and faster growth. But as debt service ratios reached very
high levels in the 1980s, it became clear that for many of these countries, debt repayment
would constrain economic performance in their countries. More importantly, it would
be virtually impossible to repay back these loans and leave reasonable resources to
support the domestic economy.
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Attempts to cope with the debt crisis through the adoption of IMF-supported
programmes proved unsuccessful in alleviating the excruciating debt problem. The
Although, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) had some benefits like for instance
easier access to foreign exchange, significant improvement in non-oil exports as a result
of export incentives and improvement in Government revenue.

However, SAP have

invariably resulted in increasing unemployment, low capacity utilisation, galloping
inflation, high incidence of poverty, unsustainable fiscal deficit and further escalation of
debt, among others. The Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative formulated
by the IMF/World Bank has also fallen short of what is required to re-establish the
conditions for sustained economic growth. The fiscal burden of debt servicing is inimical
to economic growth and, is, in fact, an important reason for the failure of SAP to restore
economic growth in many of the debt distressed countries.
The international community reacted to this development by coming up with plans to
ensure that these indebted countries secure some relief. Such efforts as the Brady Plan,
the Trinidad/Naples Terms, the Mauritius Mandate and the HIPC Initiative were all put
forward to address what has now become the debt crisis. It is a global crisis because any
massive default will rock the international financial system to its very foundations and,
possibly, lead to a worldwide depression.
Several factors, both domestic and external, were advanced as reasons for the
deteriorating African debt crisis. High among them was excessive borrowing by LDCs in
the 1970s, the oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/80 and worsening terms of trade.
Other factors affecting the debt burden include rising world interest rates resulting from
monetary contractions in some advanced countries and exchange rates fluctuation.
Inappropriate domestic macroeconomic policies and political instability also played a
major role in retarding the debtor nations’ ability to grow out of debt burden, creating
uncertainty, which compounds the problem of business planning and production (Iyoha,
1999). Ever since, the issue of external debt and its servicing has remained a topical
subject dominating discourse on the international political economy.
The main objective of this study is to examine the impact of Nigeria’s external
indebtedness on public investment and economic growth from 1970-2004.

This study

is encouraged by the fact that no known study has explicitly modeled the interaction
between external debt, public investment and economic growth in Nigeria by employing
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the cointegrating modeling techniques. Previous studies in Nigeria generally analyzed
the impact of external indebtedness by particularly concentrating on total/private
investment or savings level rather than assessing the impact of debt overhang on
economic growth and public investment.
The paper is divided into six sections.

After the introduction, section 2 examines

Nigeria’s macroeconomic performance in the last 34 years (1970-2004); section 3
examines the genesis, trend, magnitude and structure of Nigeria’s external debt. Section
4 reviews relevant literature. Section 5 provides models specification, empirical analysis
and interpretation of results.

Finally, section 6 gives the policy implications,

recommendations and conclusion.

II.

Macroeconomic Performance

The Nigerian economy has passed through various phases of development in the last 34
years (1970 – 2004). The analysis of the performance of the economy would, therefore,
be divided into three distinct periods: (i) 1970-1980, (ii) 1981-1994 and (iii) 1995-2004.
In the period 1970-1980, the Nigerian economy enjoyed remarkable growth. This period
was characterized by massive inflow of foreign exchange earnings mainly from crude oil
exports. Nigeria’s financial credibility in the international markets was not in doubt.
For the greater part of the 1970s, domestic and direct foreign investment was at an
impressive level.

These helped to sustain real GDP growth at reasonably high levels.

The economy recorded an average growth rate of 5.0 per cent per annum during the
period. On the external sector, the country enjoyed favorable balance of payments
position owing to the significant boost from oil exports even though non-oil exports
became virtually extinct. The sector sustained an average current account surplus of 1.5
per cent of GDP during the period, while gross international reserves averaged the
equivalent of about seven months of imports. By 1980, the country’s external debt was
only US$8.9 billion or 13.9 per cent of GDP, and the debt service ratio was a modest 0.7
per cent.
The inflation rate during this period average 14.6 per cent, although, there were three
periods in which the inflation rate was over 20 per cent. The exchange rate as shown by
the index of the market rate (1995=100) was generally over-valued, with the resulting
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cheapening of imports while penalizing domestic production and exports. In other
words, overvaluation of the naira enhanced its purchasing power vis-à-vis other
international currencies.
In the period 1981-1994 Nigeria witnessed serious economic downturn and
macroeconomic aggregates showed unsatisfactory performance. Specifically, between
the period 1981 and 1984 the rate of economic growth measured by the rate of growth of
real GDP, recorded negative growth rates. The GDP achieved its best performance in
1988, but declined thereafter. It should be pointed out that the real GDP has been
growing at a decreasing rate since 1988 when it grew at 10.0 per cent; thereafter, the
figures continued to declined with the exception of 2003 when the economy achieved
another 9.6 per cent GDP growth rate (see table 1). The sharp drop in the real GDP
growth rate in the period 1989 to 1994 indicated quite clearly that the GDP growth rate
was not self-sustaining (see figure 1).
The economy also witnessed double-digit inflation during the period under review, with
the exception of 1990 when the composite consumer price index grew by 7.5 per cent.
Specifically, the inflation rate was 57 per cent in 1994 (see table 1).
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate
Real GDP Grow th Rate 1970-2004
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Thus, the objective of securing a non-inflationary growth was not reasonably attained.
The crisis in the oil market, which in turn adversely affected industrial performance, and
the long-standing neglect of agriculture accounted for the decline. The fiscal operations
of the government were consistently in deficit while the balance of payments remained
under intense pressure. The external reserves fell to US$1,041.4 million in 1983-the
lowest level in ten years. At this level, external reserves could only support 1.05 months
of imports, a situation which improved only marginally to 2.8 months of imports in 1985.
The improvement in the reserves position in 1985 was very artificial, as there was an
ample evidence to show that external trade arrears had accumulated.

There was a

dramatic jump in external debt from US$10,667.7 million in 1981 to US$29,428.8 in
1994 or 175 per cent increase in just 13 years.

The debt service ratio rose

correspondingly from 4.8 per cent in 1981 to 19.5 per cent in 1994. To reverse the
worsening economic fortunes in terms of declining growth rate, galloping inflation,
worsening balance of payments, escalating debt burden and increasing/unsustainable
fiscal deficits, among others, government introduced austerity measures in 1982. Due to
the unimpressive impact of these measures, an extensive structural adjustment
programme was put in place with emphasis on demand management to address the
issues of expansionary and inflationary policies in August 1986.
During the period 1995 to 2004, the performance of the Nigerian economy was rather
mixed. In the sub-period 1995 to 1998 the various macroeconomic aggregates moved in
the right direction. GDP growth rose from 2.4 per cent in 1995 to 3.4 percent in 1996.
The fiscal deficit/GDP ratio which was negative for most of the years, showed a positive
rate of 0.1 per cent in 1995. The rate of inflation which was about 72.8 per cent in 1995,
declined to about 29.3 per cent in December 1996. The exchange rate remained stable
for over twenty months, interest rates had been decapped and the external sector
experienced less pressure. However, debt stock trended upward to US$32,584.8 million
in 1995 before it dropped to US$28,060.0 and US$27,087.8 million in 1996 and 1997,
respectively.

The external reserves increased from US$1,410.0 million in 1995 to

US$4,080.0 million in 1996. These favorable economic fundamentals resulted from the
curtailment of wasteful expenditure, attainment of relative stability in the foreign
exchange market and the re-establishment of a favourable macroeconomic environment.
Nonetheless, the economy witnessed unprecedented corruption, mismanagement and
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international isolation due to alleged human right abuses (CBN, 1993 Perspective of
Economic Policy Reforms).
However, after six years under the democratic experiment, the economy is still groaning
under the strains of past events. GDP per capita has been on the decline. In 2004, it was
estimated at US$300 compared to US$316 in 1996 and far below its peak of over
US$1000 achieved in the 1980s. The fiscal deficit/GDP ratio, which showed a positive
rate of 6.3 per cent in 2000, recorded a negative rate of 8.9, 2.8 and 3.0 per cent in
2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. The GDP growth, which averaged below 3.0 per cent
between 1995 and 1999, took an upward turn in 2000 to 2004 increasing from 3.9 per
cent in 2000 to 4.7, 4.6, 9.6 and 6.6 per cent in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004,
respectively. However, on the average this is slightly short of the government target of
6.0 per cent.

It is important to stress that because Nigeria's population is growing at

about 3.0 per cent per annum, this improvement in GDP growth made little impact on
the overall standard of living in the country (CBN Annual Reports and World Bank
African Data Base 2003).
Average inflation rate more than doubled to 18.9 per cent in 2001, from about 7.0 per
cent in 2000, but declined to 15.0 per cent in 2004. In addition, the naira depreciated
against the US dollar, from an average of =N=80/US$1 in 1996 to =N=133.5 in 2004 at
the official foreign exchange market.

Similarly, the average parallel market rate and

bureaux de change rates depreciated from =N=85/US$1 in 1995 to =N=140.8/US$1 in
2004 (CBN Annual Report 2004).

III.

Genesis, Trends, Magnitude and Structure of Nigeria’s External
Debt

Genesis of Nigeria’s External Debt
The origin of Nigeria’s external debt dates back to 1958 when a sum of US$28 million
was contracted for railway construction. Between 1958 and 1977 the resort to foreign
borrowing was minimal, as debts contracted during the period were the concessional
loans from official sources such as the World Bank and Nigeria’s major trading partners
(i.e. bilateral and multilateral sources). These debts did not exert much pressure on the
economy because the interest charged on them was generally low, with longer repayment

Ajab and Audu: External Debt, Investment and Economic Growth

87

period from ten to forty years and this constituted about 78.5 per cent of the total debt
stock. Moreover, the country had a comfortable external reserve as a result of the
unprecedented inflow of foreign exchange receipts from crude oil exports. Nigeria was
then able to lend to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1974 under the oil facility.
In fact, Nigeria was regarded as “under-borrowed” in relations to the absorptive capacity
of the economy.
With the emergence of oil glut in 1978, however, Nigeria’s revenue from the oil sector
declined and it become expedient to borrow to support the balance of payments and to
finance projects. This led to the promulgation of Decree No. 30 of 1978, limiting the
external loans the federal government could raise to =N= 5.0 billion (US$7.7 billion).
Faced with serious deterioration in the foreign exchange position, the Nigerian
authorities were forced to raise the first “jumbo loans” of US$1 billion from the
International Capital Market (ICM) in 1978. It was probably the largest Euro loan ever
obtained by an African country.

The loan had a repayment period of eight years,

including a grace period of three years. The loan was used to finance various medium long- term projects most of which did not yield any revenue many years after repayment
on the project had commenced. The importance of these loans was that the profile of
Nigeria’s foreign debt was completely altered. Before this time, the bulk of Nigeria’s
loans was sourced from bilateral and multilateral institutions, which by their nature,
were development oriented with generous conditions in terms of maturities, low and
fixed interest rate and long grace period. In contrast, ICM loans are generally of less
favorable terms.
Another characteristic of the "jumbo loan'' was that it attracted a floating interest rate,
which was linked to the London Inter Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The effect of this was
that it made planning more difficult since the expected stream of debt service payments
could not be calculated with certainty. Thus, at the end of 1979, the level of total debt
drawn and outstanding had increased two-fold from the level of US$3.1 billion in 1977 to
US$6.2 billion in 1979. But this was comfortable at 37.1 per cent of exports and 8.1 per
cent of GDP. It is important to stress that the single act of borrowing from Euro markets
by the Obasanjo-led military administration opened the floodgates for the imprudent
borrowing by state governments. Consequently, the share of loans from bilateral and

88

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2006

multilateral sources declined substantially while borrowing from private sources at
higher interest rates and stiffer conditions increased considerably.
The recovery of the oil market in 1979, with oil prices rising to an all-time high of
US$40.00 a barrel in 1980/81, gave a notion of a buoyant economy. Consequently, some
deflationary measures put in place in 1978 were relaxed by the second republic
administration. But a new consumption pattern that favored imported goods emerged.
The import substitution industrialization strategy that was being pursued then also
depended heavily on imported raw materials and appreciated exchange rates. Besides
indiscriminate and excessive importation, there were also cases of over-invoicing and
non-shipment of actual goods for which letters of credit had been established (Africa’s
Debt Crisis, NES Selected Paper for the 1994 Annual Conference).
However, the oil boom was short-lived and when it collapsed in the early 1980s the
economy immediately suffered considerable strains. The production and consumption
pattern that emerged in the era of oil boom could not be sustained in the face of
declining foreign exchange earnings in the 1980s. Rather than address the problem of
declining foreign exchange revenue, both the federal and state governments embarked
on massive external borrowing from the International Capital Market (ICM). Thus,
pressure mounted on the various sectors of the economy resulting in huge imbalance in
government finances, low external reserves, deficits in the balance of payments and
accumulation of trade arrears in respect to both insured and uninsured trade credit.
Today, the country is under the burden of an unprecedented debt crisis. Thus, during
the period 1980-1983, the debt position almost doubled from US$8.9 to US$17.7 billion,
an increase of almost US$9 billion or 98.8 per cent in only three years.
The reality and magnitude of Nigeria’s debt problem did not dawn on her until 1982
when foreign creditors refused to open new lines of credit due to the country’s inability
to settle her import bills. This resulted in the accumulation of trade arrears amounting
to US$9.8 billion between 1983 and 1988. It then became necessary for Nigeria to seek
relief by refinancing the trade arrears. The first refinancing exercise, which was in 1983,
converted outstanding letters of credits worth US$2.1 billion. In 1984, the government
refinanced the remaining trade arrears especially those contracted through open account
and bills for collection by the issuance of promissory notes worth US$4.8 billion. Since
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then, Nigeria has signed six other restructuring agreements; three with the London Club
in 1987, 1989, and 1991. Apart from the promissory notes agreement, which has a
repayment period of 22 years, the various rescheduling arrangements provided
temporary debt relief.

Indeed, the debt stock increases with every Paris Club

rescheduling. With some agreements running concurrently, there was a bunching of
maturities. While the London Club deal, which was closed in 1992, reduced the stock of
debt by US$3.8 billion, the Paris Club rescheduling increased the debt stock with
capitalization of amounts rescheduled. Consequently, the dual problem of external debt
service burden and debt overhang emerged.
Trends, Magnitude and Structure of Nigeria’s External Debt
In absolute terms, the total external debt stock rose from a meagre US$567 million in
1970 to US$5,091 million in 1978. Between 1979 and 1985, it increased further from
US$6,216 million to US$18,904.0 million. It stood at US$25,574.0 million in 1986, and
peaked at US$33,730.0 million in 1991. Thus, between 1985 and 1991, the debt stock
increased by US$14,826.0 million or 78.4 per cent in just six years. During this period,
the increase has been astronomical due to the

indiscriminate resort to external

borrowing ostensibly to finance projects coupled with the crash in international oil price
in 1982 ( World Bank African Data Base, 2003).
With the debt buy- back arrangement and the issuance of collateralized par bonds to the
London Club of creditors in 1992, the debt stock dropped from US$33,730.0 million in
1991 to US$27,564.0 million in 1992. This changed in a significant way the structure of
Nigeria's external debt. However, by 1993, 1994 and 1995 the debt stock trended upward
to US$28,718.2, US$29,428.9 and US$32,584.8 million, respectively. The debt stock
then dropped to US$28,060.0 and US$27,087.8 million in 1996 and 1997, respectively.
This was mainly because new loans were not contracted after the reconciliation exercise
conducted in 1995 to ascertain the genuineness of some external claims. However, by
2003 and 2004, it had moved upward again, recording a total outstanding balance of
US$32,916.8 and US$35,944.6 million, respectively (see figure 2 below).
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Figure 2: Nigeria’s Debt Indicators
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Source: CBN Annual Report and Statement of Account (various issues)

Nigeria’s external debt stock has witnessed changes, both in structure and quantum.
Over the years, the classification of Nigeria's debt by source as at the end of December
2004 showed that $30.8 billon or 86.0 per cent is owed to the Paris Club of Creditors
while indebtedness to multilateral sources amounted to $2.8 billion or 8.0 per cent.
Outstanding Promissory notes constitute 2.0 per cent or $0.7 billion. Debt obligations
to the London Club amounted to $1.4 billion or 4.0 per cent. Other bilateral (non-Paris
Club) accounted for the balance of $47.5 million. Paris Club is the main source of
Nigeria external debt and the most problematic. The debt continued to rise due to
accumulation of payment arrears and default in interest payments. The arrears and
interest are capitalized and added to the debt stock, further aggravating the debt burden
(see figure 3).
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Figure 3: Nigeria’s Debt Structure

Nigeria's Debt Structure as at 2004
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IV.

Literature Review

Several studies have critically examined the problem of debt burden. The theoretical and
empirical literature include the two-gap model by McKinnon (1964) and Green and
Khan, (1990) . “Liquidity trap, weak and strong debt overhang hypothesis” postulated by
Claessen and Diwan (1990), and the concept of “debt Laffer curve” used by Krugman
(1989), etc.
Theoretical Literature
The dual-gap analysis illustrates the role of foreign capital in the development process.
The role of capital here is that it permits developing countries to invest more than they
can save domestically. This proposition is made by the two- gap model (McKinnon, 1964
and Green and Khan, 1990). They noted that the volume of savings in developing
countries was too low on account of the low income and, therefore, domestic saving
should be supplemented by foreign resources to boost investment and increase the rate
of economic growth. Provided that such funds are effectively utilised, then the country
may succeed in boosting the rate of growth of its GDP and will be able to service debt
conveniently. Foreign borrowing can contribute significantly to economic growth if the
main constraint to growth is the foreign exchange.
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Krugman (1989) and Froot and Krugman (1989) conceptualized the model of debt
overhang of developing countries by applying the theory of ”Laffer Curve”6 to obtain a
relationship between debt stock and the levels of expected repayment (i.e., debt Laffer
Curve). The theory presupposes that larger debt stocks tend to be associated with lower
probabilities of debt repayment.

The curve sloped like an inverted U-shaped, graphs

expected repayment as a function of the face value of the outstanding debt (Figure 4).

Source Author: Krugman (1989)

On the upward-sloping or “good” side of the curve, an increase in the face value of the
debt service leads to an increase in repayment up to the “threshold” level, while along the
“wrong side” of the curve ( i.e. down-ward sloping) an increase in the face value of the
debt reduces expected repayment. In a sense, debt relief, through debt service or debt
stock reduction, becomes a rational choice for both creditors and debtors, when a debtor
is said to be on the “wrong side” of the laffer curve.

When a country opens up to foreign capital and starts borrowing, the impact of debt on
growth is likely to be positive (moving from zero indebtedness to point A in figure 4),
but as debt ratio increases beyond point A, additional debt eventually slows growth.
Thus, point A can be considered as the growth-maximizing level of debt. When debt
reaches point B, however, the overall contribution of debt to growth turns negative. The

6
Laffer curve is an illustration of the thesis of an American Economist, Arthur Laffer, who postulated that there exists
some tax rate, which maximizes government tax revenues. In this case, it was proposed that taxes above the optimal
rate discourage production and, hence, result in lower revenue.
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concept of debt Laffer curve is essentially an approach used in debt reduction
mechanism.

Claessens and Diwan (1990) classified debt overhang into three different degrees:
“liquidity trap, weak debt overhang, and strong debt overhang”. A “weak” debt overhang
exists where the outstanding debt is so large that the situation cannot be resolved simply
by issuing further financing or new money for the country. The situation can only be
improved by using commitment mechanism to ensure allocation of loans for investment.

In the case of a “strong” debt overhang, the debtor postpones the implementation of
profitable investment projects until at least part of the debt is forgiven. The leaders of
the debtor country have no incentives to participate in extensive structural adjustment
program because the benefits of increased growth would end up in creditor’s pocket
while the short-term cost would rest solely on the debtor’s shoulders. Provision of large
amount of liquidity cannot improve the debt overhang problem. Thus, the resolution of
a strong debt service overhang calls for debt and debt service reduction, commitment to
large investment program, commitment to

structural economic adjustment and

provision of new money in that order.
Lastly, debt overhang is considered as liquidity trap, if external debt accumulation is not
too large, but the indebted country has to struggle with having to allocate scarce financial
resources between consumption, investment and external transfer to service existing
debt. Since extensive cut-down in funds used for consumption are politically hard to
make, then consumption expenditure takes a larger share of the debtor country’s
income, driving down investment and discouraging future output. Thus, the resolution
of illiquidity effect of a debt overhang calls for injections of substantial new money
facilities. It also calls for commitment to structural economic adjustment. Overall, the
review of the theoretical literature on external debt and growth suggests that there are
several channels through which heavy debt burden impedes growth.
Empirical Literature
Much empirical literature exists on the interactions between external debt, investment
and economic growth in cross-sectional analysis.

The economic growth-debt

relationship in developing countries is studied mainly by using OLS estimation methods
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(e.g. Borensztein, 1990; Iyoha, 1999; Chowdhury (1994). However, most of the empirical
evidence on debt overhang has been rather mixed, but many of the studies find debt
variables to be significantly and negatively correlated with investment or growth.
Borensztein (1990) using data for the Philippines found that the debt overhang
hypothesis was largely valid. Deshpande (1997) also came out with similar result from
his study of the experience of 13 severely indebted countries. Greene and Villanueva
(1991) also found evidence of the debt overhang hypothesis for 23 developing countries.
Elbadawi (1996) confirmed the debt overhang hypothesis for 99 developing countries.
Furthermore, Iyoha (1999) provides empirical support for the debt overhang hypothesis
for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).
In contrast, Cohen (1993) rejected the debt overhang theory, arguing instead, that the
important debt problem is crowding out of investment caused by debt service payments.
Warner (1992) also arrived at a similar conclusion as Cohen in his study of 13 heavily
indebted countries. Similar results were corroborated by Degefe (1992) in Ethiopia.
Generally, empirical studies on the subject are not conclusive.
Most of the empirical literature on the relationship between external debt overhang and
economic growth and investment show negative effects. The studies that have shown
favorable effects of external debt are rare. They include World Bank (1988) study for the
period 1980-86 and Chowdbury (1994) for Bangladesh, Indonesia and South America.

V. Model Specification, Empirical Analysis and Interpretation of
Results
The specification of the models are based on the empirical work of Elbadawi (1996) and
Were (2001) which are largely derived from the neoclassical framework. The work of
Elbadawi and Were are some of the recent studies that captures the effect of both current
debt flows and the effect of past debt accumulation (known as debt overhang) as well as
liquidity effect of annual debt service payments on economic growth and investment.
Similarly, their works are some of the few studies that largely focused on a cross section
of low income countries. However, our models are augmented with some debt overhang
variables to the equations to determine the significance of the direct impact of debt
overhang on economic growth and investment. Besides these variables, the models also
incorporate policy fundamental and shock variables since there are so many channels
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through which indebtedness works against growth. The dependent variable is real GDP
growth rate (GDPGR).

The explanatory variables have been identified as ratio of

external debt to GDP (LEDTGDPt), which should stimulate growth. This is because
reasonable levels of current debt inflow that help to finance productive investment are
expected to enhance growth. Past debt accumulation lagged one period (LEDTGDPt-1), as
a measure of debt overhang, debt service to export (LDSEt) captures the “crowding out”
effects. A dummy variable is also introduced as a proxy for political stability (GCRI), and
takes the value of 0 for stability and 1 for instability in the growth model.

The

functional relationships are specified as follows:
Growth Equation

GDPGR t = f (EDTGDP t , EDTGDP t −1, DSE t , GPUIV t , GPUIV t −1, FDIGDP t −1, HCD t , FISBAL t −1,
INF t , REER t , GCRI t

)

Where
GDPGRt

=

Real GDP growth rate.

EDTGDPt

=

Ratio of total external debt to GDP.

EDTGDPt-1

=

Ratio of external debt to GDP lagged one period, as a measure of
debt overhang.

DSEt

=

Total debt service as ratio of export, is expected to capture
the crowding out of total investment.

FISBALt-1

=

Lagged fiscal balance in percentage of GDP

GPUIVt

=

Public investment- GDP ratio.

GPUIVt-1

=

Public investment - GDP ratio lagged one period to reflect
the effect of past investment.

FDIGDPt

=

Private foreign investment-GDP ratio.

HCDt

=

Gross secondary school enrolment rate (proxy for the
quality of Human capital)

INFt

=

Inflation rate (reflects macroeconomic instability).

REERt

=

Effective real exchange rate (reflects credibility of policies)

GCRIt

=

Dummy variable for political stability.
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Public Investment Equation
The real GDP growth rate is included in the public investment equation in order to allow
for the possible existence of “investment accelerator effect”. The functional relationship
is consequently specified as follows:

GPUIVt = f (EDTGDPt , EDTGDPt −1, DSGDPt , RESM t , AIDGNI t , FISBALt −1, INTt , REERt ,
FDIGDPt , GDPGRt −1, GPUIVt −1

)

Where,
DSGDPt

=

Total debt service in percent of GDP (reflects the crowding
out effect of debt service on public investment).

RESMt

=

Foreign reserve as a ratio of imports.

AIDGNIt

=

Foreign aid in percent of gross national income.

INTr

=

Interest rate (to capture interest rate effect on investment.)

GDPGRt-1

=

Real GDP growth rate (captures investment accelerator
principle)

Other variables are as already defined.
Correlation Results
The objective of this section is to show whether and how strongly these pair of variables
are related. The summary of the correlation matrix are presented in table below.

The correlation matrix presented in table above confirms the time series evidence in the
literature, suggesting a negative correlation between economic growth (GDPGR) and
external debt (LEDTGDP) in Nigeria. Growth is also negatively correlated with other
debt service ratios. On the contrary, public investment (LGPUIV) is positively correlated
to external debt.
Time Series Properties
Recent developments in econometrics have shown the limitations of traditional
modeling construct in empirical analysis.

The outcome of such generating series (i.e.

working with non-stationary variables) leads to spurious regression results from which
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further inference may be meaningless. Unit root and cointegration tests are important
tests that are often used to circumvent the inherent limitations of traditional models. To
this effect, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are used to test for the stationarity
of the series so as to be sure that we are not analyzing inconsistent and spurious
relationships.

The tests show that the variables Real GDP growth rate (GDPGR),

interest rates (INT), fiscal balance in percent of GDP (FISBAL) and private foreign
investment/GDP ratio (LFDIGDP) are stationary (integrated of order zero) at 5% level of
significance. The rest of the variables were found to be stationary after differencing
once. The variables are, therefore, integrated of order I (1).
ADF Unit Root Test Results

Variable
GDPGR
LEDTGDP
LDSE
LDSGDP
LGPUIV
LHCD
INT
LINF
LREER
FISBAL
LRESM
LAIDGNI
LFDIGDP

ADF Tests
Statistics
5.2834
5.7823
6.1224
7.6963
6.4338
5.4012
4.1960
11.9801
4.5780
4.3940
12.1002
4.2703
4.7398

5% Critical Value

Level

3.5578
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5578
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5629
3.5577

I(0)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(1)
I(0)
I(1)
I(1)
I(0)
I(1)
I(1)
I 0)

The next step after finding out the order of integration of the variables was to establish
whether the non-stationary variables are cointegrated7. To establish this, the Johansen
test was used. The test indicates the presence of five and six cointegrating equations
(vectors) in the two models at 5% level of significance.

This result confirms the

existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between the variables (see annexes 1a
and 1b).

7

The concept of cointegration implies that if there is a long-run relationship between two or more nonstationary variables, deviation from this long-run path are stationary. Variables may move apart in the
short-run but be brought together by market forces, government policy or both. So variables are said to be
cointegrated if they are affected by the same long-run influence.
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Having established cointegration in the two models, growth and public investment
equations were re-specified to include an Error Correction Term (ECM).

D(GDPGRt ) = α 0 + α 1 D(LEDTGDPt ) + α 2 D(LDSE t ) + α 3 D(LGPUIVt ) + α 4 D(LFDIGDPt ) +

α 5 D(LHCDt ) + α 6 D(LINFt ) + α 7 D(LREERt ) + α 8 (GCRI t ) + α 9 D(LEDTGDPt −1 ) +
α 10 D(LGPUIVt −1 ) + α 11 D(FISBALt −1 ) + α 12 ECTt −1 + U 1t

(1)

We have the following a priori signs:

α 2 ,α 6,α 8,α 9, and α11 ≤ 0, and α1,α 3,α 4,α 5,α 7 and α10 ≥ 0
D(LGPUIVt ) = β 0 + β 1 D(LEDTGDPt ) + β 2 D(LDSGDPt ) + β 3 D(LRESM t ) + β 4 D(LAIDGNI t ) +

β 5 D(LFDIGDPt ) + β 6 D(INTt ) + β 7 D(LREERt ) + β 8 D(FISBALt ) + β 9 D(GDPGRt −1 ) +
β10 D(LEDTGDPt −1 ) + β11 ECT(t −1) + U 2t
(2)
We hypothesize the following signs:

β 2, β 6, β8, and β10 ≤ 0, and β1, β 3, β 4, β 5, β 7 , andβ 9 ≥ 0
Granger Causality Test
Granger proposed the causality concept in 1969: the variable Y2t is the cause of Y1t, if the
predictability of Y1t is improved when the information related to Y2t is incorporated in
the analysis. The basic principle of Granger causality analysis is to test whether past
value help to explain current value. Maddala (1998) indicates that if two variables are
cointegrated, there must be at least one direction of causality between investigated
variables. Our objective is to investigate whether observation of a variable like public
investment (LGPUIV) is potentially useful in anticipating future movements in GDP
growth rate (GDPGR), and to test Granger causality between LGDPUIV and LEDTGDP,
and between GDPGR and external debt (LEDTGDP).
Interpretation of Granger Causality Result
Test for causal relationship between public investment (LGPUIV), GDP growth rate
(GDPGR) and external debt for the period 1979-2004 is shown in annex 2. The results
indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that public investment does not Granger
cause GDPGR and that LGPUIV does not Granger cause external debt (both at 5% level
of significance). With regard to the relationship between external debt and GDPGR, the
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analysis shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that external debt do not
Granger cause GDPGR, indicating that there is no evidence

of Granger causality

between external debt and GDPGR in the case of Nigeria.
Estimation Results
The results of the models obtained below used ordinary least square (OLS) technique on
time series data covering 1970-2004. The econometrics computer software package, Eviews (version 4.0) was used for the estimation.
Growth Equation
The estimated results for the growth equation are presented below:
Dependent Variable: D(GDPGR)
Variable
Coefficient
C
2.181585
D(LEDTGDP)
0.053554
D(LDSE)
-4.923255
D(LGPUIV)
3.706496
D(LFDIGDP)
-1.500176
D(LINF)
-1.690784
D(LREER)
7.949880
D(LHCD)
-18.93489
GCRI
-2.450915
DLEDTGDP(-2)
5.044408
DLGPUIV(-1)
-1.130598
DFISBAL(-1)
-0.428443
ECM(-1)
-1.751680
R-squared
0.926435
Adjusted R-squared
0.874506
Durbin-Watson statistic
1.855843

t-Statistic
2.575794
0.032759
-4.839725
2.410126
-3.380285
-2.418853
3.625443
-3.260327
-2.412374
2.832718
-0.876809
-3.871655
-9.473445
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

Probability
0.0196
0.9742
0.0002
0.0276
0.0036
0.0271
0.0021
0.0046
0.0274
0.0115
0.3928
0.0012
0.0000
17.84062
0.000000

Results for Public Investment Equation
The regression estimates for the public investment equation are presented below. The
evaluations of the results are also discussed below.
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Dependent Variable: D(LGPUIV)
Variable
Coefficient
C
0.018898
D(LEDTGDP)
-0.302245
D(LDSGDP)
0.193980
D(LRESM)
0.078930
D(LAIDGNI)
-0.552004
D(LFDIGDP)
0.129973
D(INT)
0.018063
D(LREER)
-0.471518
D(FISBAL)
-0.024264
DLEDTGDP(-1)
-0.029510
DGDPGR(-1)
0.028391
DLGPUIV(-1)
0.033130
ECM(-1)
-0.733695
R-squared
0.739206
Adjusted R-squared
0.565343
Durbin-Watson statistic
1.918196

t-Statistic
0.277232
-1.294962
2.105787
0.847027
-2.488590
2.423560
1.173675
-2.220070
-2.223478
-0.125300
2.211118
0.205981
-2.587835
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

March 2006

Probability
0.7848
0.2117
0.0495
0.4081
0.0228
0.0261
0.2558
0.0395
0.0392
0.9017
0.0402
0.8391
0.0186
4.251658
0.002962

Other Diagnostic Tests
The outcome of the diagnostic tests is satisfactory.

A value with a corresponding

probability greater than 5% is an indication of good result. The results of the test further
suggest that the model is well specified and robust for policy analysis (see annex 3). In
addition to the above tests, the CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares stability tests were
performed in order to establish the reliability and stability of our model.

The graphs

show that the parameter movements are within the critical lines at the 5% level of
significance, indicating stability of the model (see annex 4).
Interpretation of Results
Growth Equation
Several of the variables considered in the determination of the growth regression output
were found to be statistically significant and

with t-statistics greater than two in

absolute terms, namely, LDSE, LGPUIVt, LFDIGDPt, LINFt, LREERt, LHCDt, GCRIt,
LEDTGDP(t-1), and FISBAL(t-1). The rest of the variables LEDTGDPt, and LGPUIV(t-1) are
not statistically significant.

Similarly, all the variables have the hypothesized sign,

except LEDTGDP(t-2), LFDIGDPt , LHCDt and LGPUIV(t-1).
The regression results of the error correction model (ECM), in the growth equation
support our hypotheses by confirming the existence of crowding out and import
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compression hypotheses in Nigeria. This means that debt servicing pressure in the
country has had a significant adverse effect on the growth process. However, the
coefficient of past debt accumulation (LEDTGDPt-2) relates positively to economic
growth, thus contradicting the prescription of the debt overhang hypothesis in Nigeria.
This result was not expected. However, the explanation for the positive relationship
could be found in the structure of public finance in Nigeria.

In the past the need for

foreign borrowing by Nigeria was minimal, as debt contracted by the country were
concessional debt from official sources such as the World Bank and Nigeria’s trading
partners. These debts did not exert much pressure on the economy because the interest
charged on the loans was generally low, with longer repayment period. Moreover, these
loans and grants financed a lot of consumption and investment expenditure in many
sectors of the economy, notably education, health, transport and communication etc.
Nonetheless, the country had comfortable external reserves as a result of the
unprecedented inflow of foreign exchange from oil exports.
The results further revealed some evidence in support of a positive relationship between
current capital inflow in Nigeria and economic growth (LEDTGDPt), but that support is
not robust. Perhaps the results could point to the impact of external resources in the
Nigerian growth process and suggest that Nigeria depends heavily on external resources.
These results are consistent with the findings from similar studies (e.g Elbadawi, 1996,
Were, 2001).
Fiscal balance as a per cent of GDP (lagged one period), inflation rate, and human capital
development negatively affects economic growth while the real effective exchange rate is
positively related to economic growth. Political instability negatively affects economic
growth, as the dummy variable introduced to capture political instability had a negative
sign.
The lagged error correction term (ECMt-1) has the expected negative sign (-1.75) and
highly significant. The negative value supports our earlier findings of the cointegrating
relationship between the variables. The coefficient indicates speed of adjustment of
around -1.75 which is relatively high.

This implies that following short-run

disequilibrium, 175% of the adjustment to the long-run takes place within one period.
The coefficient of determination relating to the goodness of fit, measured by the R2
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indicates that 92% of the variations in GDP growth rate are explained by the
independent variables during the period of the study. The F-.statistics of 17.84 with a
corresponding low probability of 0.00000 is a clear indication that the model is well
specified. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.85 indicates that autocorrelation is not a
problem in our specification.
Public Investment Equation
The result shows that the variables LDSGDPt, LAIDGNIt, LFDIGDPt, LREERt, FISBALt,
and GDPGRt-1 are found to be statistically significant. The remaining variables are not
statistically significant.

All the variables have their hypothesized sign, except

LEDTGDPt, LDSGDPt, LAIDGNIt, LINTt and LREERt
In the public investment equation, past debt accumulation (LEDTGDPt-1) negatively
affects public investment. This outcome is expected and revealed some evidence in
support of the debt overhang hypothesis in Nigeria. However, that support is not robust
in the model.

On the other hand, debt service ratio (LDSGDP) is positively related to

investment, thus contradicting the prescription of crowding out hypothesis in Nigeria.
This result was unexpected.

The sign of this variable is an aberration.

However, the

structure of the economy might have accounted for the aberration. Crude oil dominated
the country’s export; and if a significant proportion of the debt service is linearly related
to oil exploration through the joint venture operations, and given that oil exports and
investment/economic growth are highly correlated, then the outcome is not surprising.
The more debt obligations the oil companies and the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation (NNPC) settled the more creditworthy the sector becomes, hence the more
vibrant the sector and the economy. It is also plausible to argue that debt service ratio
for Nigeria has been relatively small compared to other low-income highly - indebted
countries. This is because of the country’s determination not to spend beyond 30.0 per
cent of it earnings on debt service. The results further suggest that GDP growth rate is
positively related to public investment through the accelerator mechanism and this
supports the a priori expectation that the rate of growth of GDP should be positively
related to investment.

The results also show that private foreign investment is a key

determinant of public investment confirming the complementarity’s hypothesis in
production.
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The lagged error correction term (ECMt-1) has the expected negative signed (-0.73) and
statistically significant at 1 level %.

The result confirms the existence of long run

relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. The coefficient of the
error term indicates a speed of adjustment of around -0.73. This suggests that following
short-run disequilibrium/deviation, 73% of the adjustment to the long-run take place
within one period either by market mechanism, government intervention or a
combination of both. The R-squared (R2) of 0.74, which measures goodness of fit,
indicates that 74% of the systematic variations of public investment in Nigeria is
explained by the explanatory variables during the period of the study. The overall Fstatistics of 4.25 with a low probability of less than 5%, gives clear evidence that the
equation is well fitted. The Durbin-Watson statistics of 1.91 indicates the absence of
autocorrelation in our specification.

VI. Policy Implications, Recommendations and Conclusion
Policy Implications
The heavy debt burden that confronts Nigeria has adversely affected the level of
economic performance. Though kept below 20.0 per cent, the level of debt service
payments still remains large. This means that the resources that would have been used
for investment are diverted to meeting debt service obligations. The debt servicing and
the adjustment policies required to address the debt burden have also worsened social
welfare in the area of education, health, communication, etc.

The most serious

implication of debt overhang is that, it has reduced the amount of foreign exchange
available to finance the importation of raw materials and capital goods needed for rapid
economic development. This means that the debt burden has denied the industrial and
agricultural sectors the needed inputs, holding back new investments and even the
maintenance of capital stock. The import compression effect, which arose from the
decline in foreign exchange earnings from the levels in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, and
the need to meet debt service obligations, led to a reduction in commitments to
development projects. For most of the 1980’s and part of the early 1990’s, real GDP
growth was negative.
The pursuance of improved macroeconomic policies, which is an essential condition to
cope with the pressures of debt and debt service, has caused a decline in living standards
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because of debt build-up, arrears on debt, debt-service and external commercial
payments, thus stretching the supply of foreign exchange to the limit. The accumulation
of arrears arose over the years because of the inadequate financial provision of external
debt service. Such arrears on debt service obligations increased to about $19.0 billion at
the end of 2002 and accounted for about 60.3 per cent of the total indebtedness during
the period. These have impaired or worsened Nigeria’s credit ratings in the international
market as the country was classified as the third most risky country in terms of credit
rating in 1994.

The country could no longer attract the needed foreign capital to

augment domestic savings. It also made the rescheduling of Nigeria’s debt difficult by
the Paris Club of Creditors. This is because the country is perceived by the creditors to
possess the capacity to service its debt beyond what is currently paying. This illusion has
eroded the confidence of both domestic and potential foreign investors.
Policy Recommendations
Based on the above policy implications, the study provides the following policy
recommendations for consideration.
¬ Nigeria must press for substantial debt reduction in the external debt stock, in
order to achieve sustainable growth and economic development. Debt forgiveness
or interest write-offs are recommended rather than temporary debt relief.
¬ The need to expand the country’s productive capacity base is also quite apparent.
In this regard, the promotion of non-oil exports in order to increase the exports
earnings of the country should be encouraged; specifically, the revitalization of
agriculture is recommended. This effort should be consolidated through
backward integration.
¬ Greater emphasis must be placed on maximizing the concessionary assistance
from multilateral institutions as well as encouraging foreign direct investment.
Borrowing, especially from commercial creditors, could be considered only after
detailed feasibility studies on the social and commercial viability of the project
have been undertaken and should not be guaranteed by government. As long as
investments maintain commercial net worth by paying interest and principal
regularly, borrowing will not constitute a problem.
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¬ Government should curtail its extra-budgetary activities and reduce its
expenditure. In other words, there should be fiscal discipline.
¬ The country should be stabilized politically in order to attract foreign direct
capital in the form of direct and portfolio investment. If there is no political
stability, private investors will relocate their enterprises or simply wait for the
instability to dissipate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have seen the interaction between external debt, investment and
economic growth.

We also acknowledge the fact that Nigeria is a developing country

with great potential for rapid growth. However, we realize that this could not be possible
without adequate investment. Thus, given the capital inadequacy of the nation both in
terms of foreign exchange and domestic savings, one option is to obtain foreign financing
to bridge these gaps. But, if foreign borrowing is to be resorted to, such funds must be
invested in productive activities; that is the marginal efficiency of investment or internal
rate of return must be higher than the cost of capital.
Finally, Nigeria still has a chance of overcoming her external debt problems by
cultivating the right policies such as trade liberalization, tax reforms, favorable
investment climate, etc and, through deeper debt relief/debt cancellation. The debt
relief will enable the country to use the lean foreign exchange earnings to procure the
badly needed inputs for industries and infrastructures; this would help in restoring
investment, financial solvency and promoting economic growth.
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Annex 1(A): Johansen Cointegration Test for Growth Equation

Series: GDPGR LEDTGDP LDSE LGPUIV LFDIGDP LREER LINF FISBAL LHCD GCRI
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Hypothesized

Trace

5 Percent

1 Percent

No. of CE(s)

Eigenvalue

Statistic

Critical Value

Critical Value

None **

0.999877

655.7342

212.67

226.40

At most 1 **

0.967174

376.5775

175.77

187.31

At most 2 **

0.950274

270.6654

141.20

152.32

At most 3 **

0.910929

177.6272

109.99

119.80

At most 4 **

0.760024

102.6591

82.49

90.45

At most 5

0.596840

58.41544

59.46

66.52

At most 6

0.365367

30.25434

39.89

45.58

At most 7

0.297488

16.15839

24.31

29.75

At most 8

0.149695

5.212512

12.53

16.31

At most 9

0.005968

0.185564

3.84

6.51

*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels
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Annex 1(B): Johansen Cointegration Test for Public Investment Equation
Series: LGPUIV LEDTGDP LDSGDP GDPGR LRESM LAIDGNI LFDIGDP INT LREER FISBAL
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 1
Hypothesized
No. of CE(s)
None **

Eigenvalue

Trace
Statistic

5 Percent

1 Percent

Critical Value

Critical Value

0.995198

448.5296

212.67

226.40

At most 1 **

0.903172

283.0282

175.77

187.31

At most 2 **

0.873241

210.6488

141.20

152.32

At most 3 **

0.842210

146.6193

109.99

119.80

At most 4 *

0.603888

89.37805

82.49

90.45

At most 5 *

0.534149

60.67025

59.46

66.52

At most 6

0.417013

36.98964

39.89

45.58

At most 7

0.346788

20.26235

24.31

29.75

At most 8

0.203683

7.060895

12.53

16.31

At most 9

1.28E-05

0.000397

3.84

6.51

*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level
Trace test indicates 6 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level
Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at the 1% level
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Annex 2: Result of Granger Causality Test
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1970 2004
Lags: 1
Null Hypothesis:
LGPUIV does not Granger Cause GDPGR

Obs

F-Statistic

Probability

32

4.46042

0.04342

2.89356

0.09964

0.03614

0.85055

0.10859

0.74413

1.00469

0.32447

4.77686

0.03707

GDPGR does not Granger Cause LGPUIV
LEDTGDP does not Granger Cause
GDPGR

32

GDPGR does not Granger Cause LEDTGDP
LEDTGDP does not Granger Cause LGPUIV

32

LGPUIV does not Granger Cause LEDTGDP
Probability is the critical probability (acceptance probability)

The null hypothesis Ho is accepted as soon as probability is higher than 5%

Annex 3: Summary of Diagnostic Tests
Summary of Diagnostic Tests for Growth Equation
Test

(1)

F-Statistics

Probability

Jack-Bera Normality

0.51

0.77

Breuesch-Godfrey

0.11

0.73

White Heteroskedacity

0.23

0.99

RAMSEY Reset

0.05

0.82

Summary of Diagnostic Tests for Public Investment
Test

(2)

F-Statistics

Probability

Jack-Bera Normality

0.86

0.65

Breuesch-Godfrey

0.03

0.85

White Heteroskedacity

0.40

0.94

RAMSEY Reset

0.26

0.61
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Annex 4: CUSUM and CUSUM of Square Stability Test
i)

CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares stability for Growth Equation (1)
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CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares stability for Public Investment Equation (2)
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